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Abstract 
Procedural standards of participation have the capacity to structure and constrain the 
exercise of authority. Focusing on the way decisions are formed, this article argues 
that the depletion of such standards in processes of reception of trans- and 
international decisions within the EU potentially leads to situations of unrestrained 
authority and can constitute a challenge to the rule of law. It sets out the basis for a 
conceptual and normative analysis underpinning the argument that procedural 
standards of participation can be considered part of the rule of law.  
The depletion of such standards is one facet of a broader problem. Intertwined 
decision-making procedures that cut across EU and international levels of governance 
challenge the ability of law to limit executive action. The challenges that 
internationalized rulemaking procedures pose to law can only be apprehended if they 
are seen in their entirety as segments of a broader regulatory cycle. On this basis, this 
article proposes a re-conceptualization of the decision-making procedures that operate 
the substantive coordination between different sites of governance. Having a EU 
focus, the article contributes to analyzing the challenges and possibilities of the rule 
of law in the current realities of diffusion of power resulting from internationalization. 
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1. Internationalized rulemaking and procedural standards of 
participation 
The provision of public goods depends increasingly on decisions adopted by a variety 
of bodies at different levels and sites of governance. Internationalization is one factor 
of this diffusion of decision-making power. In the EU and elsewhere, regulatory 
policies are often defined and decisions are taken under the influx of acts adopted in 
international fora. Substantive issues pertaining to the food we eat, to the testing of 
pharmaceuticals, to the risks of hazardous substances and chemicals increasingly 
depend on rules and decisions adopted internationally or trans-nationally, are then 
transposed into EU law, and thereby filtered into national laws.2 Decisions 
proceeding from a variety of external fora are incorporated in EU law. The source of 
legal authority of the decisions received may be uncertain;3 nonetheless, they may 
acquire an undisputable legal character by the fact of reception or, at least, a 
normative constraining effect they lacked at the international or transnational level. 
To the extent that this is the case, the intersection between EU law and inter- and 
                                                                
 
 
 
2 For examples, see Joana Mendes, EU law and global regulatory regimes: hollowing out procedural 
standards? 10 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Symposium “Public Authority in 
Global Governance”, (2012) pp. 988-1022, and Joana Mendes, Administrative Law Beyond the States: 
Participation at the Intersection of Legal Systems in GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND EU 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. RELATIONSHIPS, LEGAL ISSUES AND COMPARISON (Edoardo Chiti and 
Bernardo Mattarella eds., Springer, 2011) pp. 111-132. For the US, see Stewart, The Global 
Regulatory Challenge to US Administrative Law, 27 NYU JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
POLITICS 695, at pp. 703-705 (2005), who argues that this exposure to the influence of global 
regulation marks a third phase of evolution of US administrative law (p. 698, 715). See also David 
Livshiz, Updating American Administrative Law: WTO, International Standards, Domestic 
Implementation and Public Participation, 24 WISCONSIN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 961 (2007). 
The literature on the expansion of global regulatory regimes is extensive. See, for example, Cassese 
Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 NYU JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 663, pp. 670-673 (2006). 
3 E.g. reception is grounded on a functional argument not captured by the formally assumed 
international commitments of the EU (e.g. best practices). 
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transnational regulatory regimes opens new paths of public action.4 At the same time, 
as previous research has shown, procedural standards that structure decision-making 
within the EU – among them, those that set the terms of participation – tend to be 
weaker in the segments of EU law that result from the reception of international and 
transnational decisions.5 This may occur as a result not only of arguably imperfect 
formal rules of reception, but also of informal links of administrative collaboration 
established between EU institutions and bodies, on the one hand, and inter- and 
transnational regulatory bodies or networks, on the other.6 
This article focuses on procedural standards of participation to argue that their 
depletion by effect of reception can constitute a challenge to the premise that public 
authority ought to be structured and constrained by law.7 Reception depletes the 
capacity of procedural standards to structure discretion and thereby constrain the 
exercise of public authority in areas of regulation where courts hardly enter. It 
potentially leads to situations of unrestrained authority. This perspective unfolds the 
deeper impact of reception of inter- and trans-national decisions on law’s capacity to 
limit the executive. By relying on the external ramifications of its internal regulatory 
activity, the executive loosens the procedural constraints that would otherwise apply 
to its decision-making procedures.8 The depletion of procedural standards therefore 
emerges as a problem of the rule of law, as it limits the law’s ability to structure the 
exercise of discretion and constrain public authority. Behind complex governance 
                                                                
 
 
 
4 The argument is developed in Mendes, Administrative Law Beyond the States: Participation at the 
Intersection of Legal Systems (supra note 2), pp. 111-132 and in Mendes, EU law and global 
regulatory regimes (supra note 2). 
5 For more detail, see Mendes, EU law and global regulatory regimes (supra note 2), Section 3. 
Highlighting the same problem for US decisions shaped by global regulatory norms and practices, 
Stewart (supra note 2) at 702, pp. 705-709.   
6 Stressing the relevance of administrative incentives, in the case of the US, see Stewart (supra note 2), 
pp. 705, 719, 747. 
7 Contrasting a governance and a public law perspective in the analysis of regulation beyond the state, 
Armin von Bogdandy et al., Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal 
Framework for Global Governance Activities in THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY BY 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. ADVANCING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armin von 
Bogdandy et al. eds., Springer, 2010) 3, pp. 7-16. Authority is used in this article as defined by 
Bogdandy et al., idem, pp. 11-12. 
8 Also indicating the problems of a sharp distinction between international and domestic affairs, from 
the perspective of the limitation of executive power, see Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of 
Globalization in 98 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 167, pp. 187-189 (1999), albeit referring to treaty-making 
powers. 
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arrangements that articulate EU and international actors and their decisions, what 
may be at stake is the balance between the exercise of authority, on the one hand, and 
the protection of autonomy, on the other, on which public law mechanisms have been 
built within the state. This article has an undeniable EU focus. Its starting point are 
the effects that the interaction between the EU and other regulatory systems has on 
EU (domestic) procedural standards.9 Yet, as approached here, this “internal 
perspective” points to the external and deeper dimension of the problem. What is 
being depleted are not rules or practices that assume a specific form in domestic legal 
systems, but the premise that law ought to structure and constrain the exercise of 
authority, irrespective of whether it results from internal or external action. This leads 
one to question the very legitimacy of inter- and trans-national decision-making 
procedures, even if through the lens of the values upheld in the domestic legal 
systems.10 
Framing the depletion of procedural standards that ensure participation in 
decision-making procedures as a rule of law problem raises a number of conceptual 
and normative issues, which this article addresses. To begin with, the association of 
this phenomenon with the rule of law is prone to criticism for two main reasons. First, 
the legal character of the procedural standards at stake is disputed. The use of the 
term “standard” connotes the idea that the rules or practices that support participation 
in decision-making procedures at the global level do not pertain strictly to law.11 As 
they are practiced within the EU and within inter- and transnational regulatory 
regimes, they belong to the language code of governance and are far from being 
affiliated with the rule of law. Indeed, often these standards were put into place to 
enable public authorities to benefit from the knowledge of stakeholders, to create 
                                                                
 
 
 
9 Mendes, EU law and global regulatory regimes (supra note 2). 
10 On the multifaceted concept of legitimacy, see Black, Constructing and contesting legitimacy…, 
(supra note 12), in particular pp. 144-150. Acknowledging the limits of adopting a legal perspective on 
legitimacy, this article sets out to assess the extent to which internationalized decision-making 
procedures can be captured by law. 
11 On a similar use of the term – opposing it to “principles” and “rights” – see Carol Harlow, Global 
Administrative Law. The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 187, at p. 190 (2006). 
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motivation for compliance, as a means of adjusting to claims of legitimacy.12 Second, 
in the examples referred in this article, these standards apply to procedures that lead 
to the adoption of regulatory decisions of general scope. Natural and legal persons are 
affected only indirectly insofar as such decisions bind or commit their authors and 
other decision-makers. The focus of the article is not due process guarantees depleted 
when the chain of intertwined decisions results in the exercise of direct authority over 
individuals impairing their fundamental rights, which would speak directly to the rule 
of law.13  
Next, once established that treating the depletion of procedural standards as a rule 
of law problem is conceptually possible, this approach has normative consequences. 
Procedural standards ought to retain the capacity of procedural law to structure 
discretion and constrain the exercise of public authority, which results from the 
intertwinement of decisions that cross different legal and regulatory systems. This 
approach will require adjustments and variations to the procedural rules currently 
practiced. Finally, this capacity also requires a reconceptualization of the procedures 
through which such intertwinement operates, or at least of the external role of the 
actors involved. Instances of public authority emerge from the external links between 
procedures. Internationalized procedures are neither only European, national nor 
international.14 They result from a cascade of intertwined decisions. For this reason, 
they ought not be seen in segmented terms, at the risk of impeding solutions that 
constrain such authority. 
The argument that the depletion of procedural standards of participation can be a 
rule of law problem is developed in the first part of the article. The article begins by 
returning to the empirical analysis on which it is based in order to assess the extent to 
                                                                
 
 
 
12 Julia Black, Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory 
regimes, 2 REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE 137, at pp. 144-151 (2008). 
13 The prominent example would be the reception in EU law of the UN Security Council resolutions 
establishing terrorist sanctions. That due process guarantees are an aspect of the rule of law is a 
common law perspective; it is however not unknown in the German conception of Rechtstaat and in 
the French construction of État de droit (see, e.g. Jacques Chevallier, L’ÉTAT DU DROIT, 
(Montchrestien, 5th ed., 2010) pp. 14-16, 19, 30, 51-52.  
14 Delmas-Marty, Governance and the rule of law in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE. A NEW PARADIGM 
FOR DEVELOPMENT? (Séverine Bellina, Hervé Magro, Violaine de Villemur eds., Hurst & Co, 2009) 
pp. 207-216, at p. 208.  
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which internationalized decision-making procedures may lead to instances of 
unrestrained authority (Section 2). Unrestrained authority, if it is possible to establish 
it, refers only to the formation of decisions. Therefore, the article addresses only one 
of several ways in which discretion can be structured and authority constrained. Also 
in Section 2, the article crucially moves on to clarify the conceptual, methodological 
and normative premises that enable us to read the depletion of procedural standards 
of participation in the light of the rule of law. This is the starting point of a more 
detailed conceptual and normative analysis that establishes the basis to bridge the two 
terms of a prima facie odd equation – participation and rule of law – and indicates the 
reasons why they ought to be bridged (Section 3). The second part of the article 
outlines the normative consequences of reading the depletion of procedural standards 
as a rule of law problem. It argues that governance practices might need to be re-
interpreted in legal terms, revealing also the limits of current EU procedures. In 
addition, it argues that, to the extent that the exercise of authority stemming from 
intertwined EU and international procedures is to be brought under the realm of law, 
the respective procedures need to be reconceptualized. The article suggests two 
possible routes: conceptualize them as composite procedures; emphasize the 
procedural duties of the EU institutions and bodies when acting in an external role 
(Section 4). 
2. Framing the problem: A challenge to the rule of law 
2.1. Two instances of depletion 
Unrestrained public authority may occur insofar as international decisions received in 
the EU legal order are not subject to procedural constraints that would apply should 
such decisions be adopted internally, while by effect of reception they acquire the 
legal force that equivalent EU acts would have.15 Let us start by revisiting two 
examples on which this argument is built in order to better assess the contours of the 
                                                                
 
 
 
15 As mentioned, the following analysis zooms in decision-making procedures and, specifically, rules 
and practices of participation, ignoring other possible mechanisms of control.  
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problem.16 They refer to limit situations where the legal character of the procedural 
rules depleted and/or of the decisions finally adopted can be questioned. But in both 
cases the constraining effect of reception may have an indirect impact on the legal 
sphere of individuals.  
The EU is member of the International Convention for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas, and, as such, legally bound by the decisions of the respective 
Commission (ICCAT), among which fisheries conservation and management 
measures.17 Such measures – for example, recommendations regarding the definition 
of total allowable catches of Bluefin tuna – are incorporated in EU law via Council 
Regulations adopted on the basis of article 43(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU).18 These are decisions that are at the core of the EU 
Common Fisheries Policy. They have far-reaching impacts on the range of legally 
protected interests that ought to be protected and pursued in its implementation.19 
Equivalent EU acts that do not stem from international obligations are subject to 
consultation of Regional Advisory Councils, composed of interest representatives.20 
By legal determination, the Council needs to take their views into account when 
                                                                
 
 
 
16 The examples are taken from Mendes, EU law and global regulatory regimes (supra note 2), where 
more detail is given. 
17 Article VIII(1)(a), (2) and (3) of the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(available at http://www.iccat.es/Documents/Commission/BasicTexts.pdf, (last visited December 10, 
2013). See, generally, Communication from the Commission “Community participation in Regional 
Fisheries Organizations (RFOs), COM (1999) 613 final Brussels (Dec. 8, 1999), pp. 6-9. 
18 For example, Annex ID of Council Regulation (EU) No 40/2013 of 21 January 2013 fixing for 2013 
the fishing opportunities available in EU waters and, to EU vessels, in certain non-EU waters for 
certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks which are subject to international negotiations or 
agreements 2013 O.J (L 23) 54 (Jan. 25, 2013). Another type of measures are recovery plans – see, for 
example, Council Regulation (EC) No 302/2009 of 6 April 2009 concerning a multiannual recovery 
plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, amending Regulation (EC) No 43/2009 
and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1559/2007, 2009 O.J. (L 96) 1 (Ap. 15, 2009). 
19 Article 2(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation 
and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy, as amended 
2002 O.J. (L 358) 59 (Dec. 31, 2002), currently under reform (see Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Fisheries Policy COM (2011) 425 final, 
Brussels (July 13, 2011), and http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/reform/ (last visited December 10, 2013). 
20 At present, these representatives come mainly from the industrial fishing sector, but the on-going 
reform of the Common Fisheries Policy envisages modifications also in this respect, with a view to 
ensuring a balanced representation of all interests involved (article 52(1) of the Proposal cited note 
supra).  
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pursuing the public interests protected by the EU fisheries legislation.21 Consultation 
is explicitly excluded in the case of regulations that transpose decisions of Regional 
Fisheries Organizations, such as the ICCAT, and it is not compensated by the 
possibilities of participation of interest representatives in ICCAT decision-making 
procedures.22 At least until recently, ICCAT’s were mostly closed meetings, and 
NGOs had difficulties in accessing information.23 The absence of procedural 
constraints at the international level leads then to a closed decision-making 
procedure. In addition, this procedure is not subject to a requirement of consideration 
of, or justification towards, the range of legally protected interests, which would 
apply if the decision would be adopted internally.  
The European Commission and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) are part 
of a transnational network – the International Conference on Harmonization of 
Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) – 
that gathers also representatives of the Japanese and the American regulatory 
agencies for pharmaceuticals, as well as private associations representing the 
pharmaceutical industry in these three regions.24 The ICH guidelines define the 
technical requirements that ensure the safety, efficacy and quality of new 
pharmaceutical products (e.g. requirements regarding clinical trials in humans, the 
use of animal testing, the assessment of new drug applications). They are non-binding 
guidelines. They are received in EU law as non-binding guidelines of the Committee 
for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP, operating within the EMA), but are 
used by the EMA as benchmarks against which to assess the quality, safety and 
                                                                
 
 
 
21 Article 4(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 (supra note 19). On the role of Regional 
Advisory Councils, see Mendes, EU law and global regulatory regimes (supra note 2), pp. 997-9. 
22 See Mendes, EU law and global regulatory regimes (supra note 2), pp. 1000-4. 
23 G.D. Hurry, M. Hayashi, J.J. Maguire, “Report of the Independent Review”, September 2008, pp. 
29, 71, and recommendation 50 (available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/Meetings/Docs/Comm/PLE-106-ENG.pdf, last visited December 10, 
2013). 
24 For more detail, see Ayelet Berman, Informal International Lawmaking in Medical Products 
Regulation in INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING: CASE STUDIES, (Ayelet et al eds., TOAEP 
Academic Epublisher, 2012) 355-369 (available at 
http://www.fichl.org/fileadmin/fichl/documents/LOTFS/LOTFS_3_Web.pdf, last visited December 
10, 2013).  
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efficacy of pharmaceutical products,25 which is a condition sine qua non to obtain an 
authorization to market a new drug within the EU.26 Alternative routes to comply 
with this requirement “may be taken” but need to be “appropriately justified”.27 ICH 
guidelines are adopted following a consultation procedure that, albeit conducted by 
EMA, does not provide any guarantees of due consideration of the views voiced, 
unlike the equivalent procedures followed for the adoption of purely EMA 
guidelines.28  
In this last example, an additional aspect is relevant. Even though the weight of the 
pharmaceutical industry in consultation procedures for the adoption of internal 
guidelines is likely strong, the EMA purports to involve representatives of patients, 
consumers and health care professionals in its consultation procedures.29 In 
particular, by force of EU law, the interests of patients need to be protected in the 
decision-making procedures that lead to granting an authorization to market a new 
                                                                
 
 
 
25 See, further, Mendes, Administrative Law Beyond the State: Participation at the Intersection of 
Legal Systems, supra note 2, 111-132, at p. 128 (also in Mendes, EU law and global regulatory 
regimes supra note 2, p. 1012).  
26 Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 
31 March 2004, laying down Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of 
medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency, 
2004 O.J. (L 136) 1 (Ap. 30, 2004), as amended. See also article 26 of Directive 2001/83/EC, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, of 6 November 2001, on the Community code relating to 
medicinal products for human use, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67 (Nov. 28, 2001), as amended. 
27 European Medicines Agency (EMA), “Procedure for European Union Guidelines and Related 
Documents within the Pharmaceutical Legislative Framework”, London, 18 March 2009 Doc.Ref. 
EMEA/P/24143/2004 REV. 1 corr, (henceforth “EMA Procedural Guidelines”), p. 5 (2.1 and 2.2). 
28 See further, Mendes, EU law and global regulatory regimes, supra note 2, p. 1013. EMA, 
“Procedure for European Union Guidelines”, supra note 27, p. 13. Unlike the EMA’s usual practices of 
consultation, the ICH expert working group does not disclose the justification for accepting or 
rejecting the comments received. This is however crucial to ensure the effectiveness of consultation. 
Unlike the EU procedures for the adoption of ICH guidelines, US administrative procedure seem to 
give equivalent guarantees of participation in ICH guidelines and in the internal guidelines of the US 
Food and Drug Administration – see Ayelet Berman (2012), “The Role of Domestic Administrative 
Law in the Accountability of Transnational Regulatory Networks: The Case of the ICH”, IRPA GAL 
Working Paper, 2012/1, pp. 23-28 (available at http://www.irpa.eu/gal-section/6566/ayelet-berman-
the-role-of-domestic-administrative-law-in-the-accountability-of-transnational-regulatory-networks-
the-case-of-the-ich-irpa-working-papers/, last visited December 10, 2013). 
29 EMA Procedural Guidelines, supra note 29, 16 (4.6). More generally, see “The EMA Transparency 
Policy. Draft for Public Consultation” (Doc Ref. EMEA/232037/2009 – rev), London, 19 June 2009, 
namely p. 10, available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2009/10/WC500005269.pdf (last 
visited December 10, 2013). 
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drug.30 The EMA is bound by this requirement. This is not an explicit condition that 
ICH needs to comply with, which may influence the assessment of the views 
submitted by these groups where they actually participate in consultation procedures, 
fading their voice even more.31 Crucially, in internal procedures, the pharmaceutical 
industry does not have a formal say in the adoption of internal guidelines, whereas it 
does in the adoption of ICH guidelines. This feature may raise doubts regarding the 
possibility of capture.32 
The reception of ICH guidelines seems to pose more serious problems than the 
reception of decisions of ICCAT regarding the allocation of fishing opportunities, 
mentioned above. The problem is not only that the internationalized procedure gives 
fewer guarantees of participation. The problem is also that there are no procedural 
guarantees that the public interests that the EMA is bound to comply with by force of 
EU legislation are effectively considered in the adoption of the ICH guidelines that 
are incorporated in EU law. Although the purposes of the ICH are not incompatible 
with those interests – technical harmonization may even have an important role in 
fostering them – its activity is driven by commercial needs.33 The risk that ICH 
guidelines may deviate from the public interests protected by EU pharmaceutical 
legislation may be enhanced by the possibility that embeddedness in transnational 
networks may increase the autonomy of EMA vis-à-vis the Commission and the 
Member States, as recent research suggests.34 
2.2. Unrestrained public authority? 
                                                                
 
 
 
30 Article 3(2)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, supra note 26. 
31 A point also made in Mendes, EU law and global regulatory regimes (supra note 2), p. 1013. 
32 On this point, see Berman, (supra note 28), p. 27. 
33 It mainly aims at “reducing or obviating duplication of testing carried out during the research and 
development of new human medicines” (ICH Terms of Reference (2000), available at 
http://www.ich.org/about/vision.html, last visited December 10, 2013). See also Berman, Informal 
International Lawmaking, supra note 24, p. 357. 
34 Martijn Groenleer, Linking up levels of governance: agencies of the European Union and their 
interaction with international institutions in THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON 
THE EUROPEAN UNION. WHEN MULTILATERALISM HITS BRUSSELS (Oriol Costa and Knud-Erik 
Joergensen eds., Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) pp. 135-54. Groenleer explicitly says that his is a tentative 
conclusion in need of confirmation by further empirical research. 
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May these situations lead to possible instances of unrestrained authority? This case 
needs to be made with care. First, what results from the above is that international 
decisions may not be subject to procedural guarantees of participation that structure 
equivalent decision-making procedures in the EU. Per se, this does not necessarily 
entail a judgment regarding the exercise of authority. It may be debatable whether 
these decision-makers are vested with public authority and whether their 
determinations have legal value or nature (for example, the authority of the ICH 
guidelines comes from the fact that an international expert forum, composed of 
regulators and industry, enacts them as best practices).35 Secondly, this also does not 
entail a judgment regarding the adequacy of the procedures followed for their 
adoption. These procedures may be adequate for the type of decisions adopted at the 
international level and to the purposes served by the bodies that adopt them. It is also 
arguable that, irrespective of the level at which they are made, some of these 
decisions may be better left to the technical or political process, outside of the legal 
or quasi-legal realm. Certainly, in their origin and design, some of them were not 
conceived as legal processes at all.  
Yet, irrespective of their source, legal or non-legal character, binding or non-
binding nature, the international decisions mentioned are received as authoritative in 
the legal systems that implement them, and may acquire a legal and constraining 
significance by effect of such reception.36 As such, they are capable both of 
constraining the legal sphere of the persons concerned by decisions adopted on their 
basis (for example, pharmaceutical industries that, being excluded from the decision-
making circles, are affected by a potentially detrimental rule), albeit indirectly; and of 
defining the composition of competing interests that, according to national or 
regional legislation valid in the systems where they are received, need to be respected 
in carrying out a given policy (for example, protection of health via a medicinal 
                                                                
 
 
 
35 See, further, Bogdandy at al, supra note 7, pp. 14-16. Concretely on these examples, Mendes, EU 
law and global regulatory regimes, supra note 2. 
36 For example, the ICH guidelines become the rules against which the quality, safety or adequacy of a 
medicinal product is assessed – an assessment that is a condition to grant a market authorization. See 
article 12(1) Regulation 726/2004 (supra note 26) and EMA Procedural Guidelines”, supra note 27, pp. 
4 and 5 (2.1 and 2.2). 
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product that constitutes a significant therapeutic, scientific or technical innovation, 
the interests of patients, animal health).37 
Whether binding or non-binding, such decisions acquire legal authority from the 
moment in which non-compliance or compliance has legal consequences – such as 
the refusal of a market authorization, or a heavier onus of proof regarding certain 
characteristics of a product, in the case of non-compliance with ICH guidelines; or 
prohibitions of fishing certain species as a result of ICCAT recommendations. This 
typically occurs at the domestic level, through reception. Even if more “imperfect” or 
no rule of participation may be adequate in the setting where these decisions are 
adopted, such rules or practices do not take into account the later vertical effect of the 
decisions adopted, that is, the effective regulatory effects such decisions end up 
acquiring by effect of reception. Arguably, for this reason, the procedural rules and 
practices followed at the international level are not adequate to decisions that end up 
being legal in character, as much as internal rules and practices may not be.38 
This is only part of the problem. The possibility of unrestrained authority does not 
result in isolation from the decisions adopted in inter- and trans-national regulatory 
fora. It results from the combination of lack of constraints in the law-making power 
of inter- and trans-national bureaucracies that would be adequate to decisions 
intended to become eventually binding on natural and legal persons, and from the 
side-stepping of procedural constraints to which domestic administrative decision-
makers would need to abide if that decision would be adopted internally.  
Irrespective of how they are formed and received, such decisions could a 
posteriori be subject to judicial review by EU and domestic courts (in the absence of 
apposite instances of review at the international level). Yet, not only is there little 
evidence so far of such controls being made,39 but also many of the regulatory 
decisions adopted in this fashion hardly ever reach the courts. The EU and domestic 
                                                                
 
 
 
37 Article 3(2)(b) Regulation 726/2004 (supra note 27). 
38 Criticizing the absence of procedural rights of participation in rulemaking procedures within the EU, 
see Joana Mendes, PARTICIPATION IN EU RULE-MAKING. A RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH, pp. 99–100 
(Oxford University Press, 2011), Chapter 5. 
39 Making this argument with regard to the US, see Stewart (supra note 2). To the author’s knowledge, 
there is no known study in EU law on this issue. An additional problem may be judicial deference 
towards the external action of the executive (see Benvenisti, supra note 8, pp. 194-195). 
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courts tend to limit their assessment to the domestic act that incorporated the 
international decision with little consideration for its international links.40 This would 
point to the need to include such controls during decision-making procedures, with a 
view to avoiding the possible absence of legal limits to the exercise of authority that 
ends up impacting on rights and legally protected interests of natural and legal 
persons. These are both individual or collective interests (for example, smaller 
pharmaceutical companies producing generic medicines that cannot comply with the 
costly standards on the quality of pharmaceuticals that ICH has decided upon),41 and 
diffuse interests (for example, the interests of patients in the marketing of 
pharmaceutical products; the environmental interests in the definition of fishing 
quotas).42  
2.3. Participation and law: premises 
The examples mentioned refer to procedural standards of participation in decision-
making procedures that involve the reception in the EU legal order of inter- and 
trans-national decisions. While analyzing the possibility and contours of 
administrative law beyond the state, some authors hesitantly include the principle of 
participation under the heading of the rule of law, as one of its components.43 Others 
consider it a “fashionable ‘good governance’ value” partially derived from 
managerial theories of public administration, rather than a classical administrative 
law principle stemming from the rule of law doctrine, albeit acknowledging the 
“particularly ambiguous” character of participation.44 Others still, in a similar vein, 
                                                                
 
 
 
40 Judicial review tends to focus on EU legal acts that transposed international decisions, and not the 
decisions themselves – see Nikolaos Lavranos, DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN 
THE EUROPEAN AND DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS OF SELECTED EU MEMBER STATES, Chapter 3 
(Europa Law Publishing, 2004), pp. 56–57. 
41 See Berman, (supra note 28), p. 12, on the concerns raised by ICH guidelines. 
42 These considerations assume that the regulatory processes at issue ought not be left only to the 
political process, due to the constraining effect they end up having in the legal sphere of natural and 
legal persons. This premise may be discussed, and one should bear in mind that not all instances of 
regulation have a legal relevance of the type that would justify legal constraints. 
43 Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (2005) 691 (see, however, 
p. 694, where the author enumerates the rule of law and the principle of participation separately). 
44 Carol Harlow, “Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values”, 17 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, pp. 188, 193, 195 (2006). 
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stress “the fluidity of principles” that circulate different fields in evolving 
contemporary law, which, at the same time, reveals the “openness of law to principles 
stemming from other disciplines”, but also constitutes “a fertile ground for 
speculations regarding global administrative law”.45  
Indeed, the legal character of participation is far from being a given. Several 
studies have highlighted the importance of participation (but also of transparency and 
accountability) in providing forms of democratic or legal legitimation (depending on 
the analysis) to certain inter- and trans-national regulatory regimes in the absence of 
state-like controls of democratic government.46 But can procedural standards of 
participation be considered as part of law? Or by attributing to participation the 
ability to structure and constrain the exercise of public authority one is just dressing 
as law a phenomenon that effectively pertains to administrative practices, at the risk 
of providing them a veil of legitimacy they would otherwise not have? These are core 
questions to the argument of this article. Two aspects matter decisively in framing the 
discussion: first, the perspective from which one approaches participation, which 
defines this concept for the purposes of the current analysis; secondly, the 
methodological stance and normative premise that underpin this article. Both shape 
the two terms of the equation under analysis.  
From a legal perspective, participation entails a set of procedural rules that ensure 
consideration and balancing of the interests affected by decision-making, and, as 
result, enhances the material justice of the decisions adopted. Material justice refers, 
in this context, to “the substantive quality of a decision that embodies a composition 
of interests which results from having taken in due consideration and having balanced 
the different public and private legally protected interests that the decision-maker is 
                                                                
 
 
 
45 Daniel Mockle, Le débat sur les principes et les fondements du droit administratif global, 53 
CAHIERS DE DROIT, 3-48 (2012), p. 31-2, emphasis added. See also Alexander Somek The Concept of 
‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law. A Reply to Benedict Kingsbury, 20 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009), 985-995 at pp. 985-8; Idem, Administration without Sovereignty, in THE 
TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, (Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin eds., Oxford University Press, 
2010) 267-288, at p. 273. 
46 The literature on this issue is vast, in particular within the Global Administrative Law project. See, 
inter alia, Cassese, supra note 43. Considering that this approach points more to a weberian type of 
legal-rational legitimation, see Mockle, supra note 45, p. 15; Chevallier, supra note 13, p. 64. 
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bound to take into account”.47 From this viewpoint, participation ought to be legally 
protected when such interests are themselves protected by the applicable law and, as 
such, need to be considered by the decision-maker in the balancing of options that 
precedes the adoption of a decision. If in a regulatory setting, such as the ones 
mentioned in the examples above, participation does not relate directly to the 
protection of rights for the lack of an adversarial-type situation, to be relevant from a 
legal point of view, it needs to relate to the protection of legally protected interests.48 
From this perspective, this justifies that participation is intrinsically linked with 
justification. It affords legal protection insofar as the decision-maker is required to 
reason its decisions, not to a specific group of interest representatives, not to the 
network of peers by simply referring to the decisions they approved, but in the light 
of the law and of the legally protected interests it is bound to pursue or to respect.49 
How far this understanding of participation matches the EU rules and practices of 
participation exemplified in the beginning of the article will be discussed below.50  
Informing the current analysis is the deeper normative concern with law’s capacity 
to extend beyond its traditional realm as well as beyond national borders, beyond 
inter-national law.51 What follows builds on the methodological premise that 
traditional categories of (state) public law ought to be revisited and, to the extent 
possible, reconceptualized, with a view to capture the instances of exercise of public 
authority and address them with legal tools.52 Arguably, this path ultimately allows 
identifying the elements in these regulatory spaces that can be captured by traditional 
categories of (state) public law, which inevitably will suffer a process of 
                                                                
 
 
 
47 Mendes, PARTICIPATION IN EU RULE-MAKING, supra note 38, p. 17, footnote 39. See also, on the 
rationales of participation Chapter 2, Section 2.2, in particular p. 35.  
48 On the difficulties of ascertaining in a given situation whether a legally protected interest is 
protected or not, see Jerry Mashaw, Administrative due process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, pp. 889-91 (1981). 
49 Although this risks strengthening the voice of only a few – see Benvenisti, supra note 8, p. 171. 
50 Section 3. 
51 Peer Zumbansen, Defining the space of transnational law. Legal theory, global governance, and 
legal pluralism, 21 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 305-335 (2012). 
52 This is in line with Zumbansen who underlines that “domestic experiences with law are crucial 
points of orientation” (supra note 51, p. 324). Although his analysis focuses on transnational law, this 
reasoning applies also within the state to alternative modes of law production. For a contrary view, 
denying that the “law beyond the state” perspective is capable of grasping “the essence of transnational 
governance processes”, see Somek, supra note 45, p. 275 and pp. 279-80.  
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transformation when travelling to political and institutional contexts different from 
the ones where they originated. The challenges posed by this premise are greater than 
what this article can realistically address given its scope and purpose. Important 
questions will remain unanswered – namely, how to identify such elements, what to 
keep of the public law categories in the new regulatory contexts, and in which 
instances (admitting that not all processes of regulation occurring beyond the state 
will be able to be captured by law, or, at least, the advantages of doing so might not 
overcome the disadvantages).  
This methodological standpoint is informed by a normative premise. Accepting 
that, at whichever level it is exercised, “public power stands in need of legitimation 
and limitation”53, this article proposes that some of the mechanisms that are already 
in place in inter- and transnational settings – set up to at least create the impression of 
a structured exercise of discretion and to lend a sense of legitimacy to the respective 
decisions – be re-interpreted in the light of the idea that the exercise of such authority 
ought to be constrained. This may require bringing those mechanisms into the 
purview of law, and, in turn, extending law – and possibly also the rule of law – into 
the realm of regulation and governance where it does not always sit comfortably. The 
purpose of this re-interpretation would be to address the tension between authority 
and autonomy, in the sense of respect for a private sphere of liberty and dignity, as it 
enfolds today outside state-like sites of law production and, in particular, in supra-, 
inter- and transnational spaces. Internationalized procedures, albeit resorting to 
alternative modes of regulation, and irrespective of their form, may ultimately put at 
stake the balance between the exercise of authority and the protection of 
liberty/dignity that has been at the core of public law instruments in the liberal 
constitutional state. This may occur to the extent that such processes risk leaving a 
wide purview of discretion in the hands of decision-makers, whose decisions are 
                                                                
 
 
 
53 Dieter Grimm, The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World in THE 
TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM?, supra note 45, pp. 3-22, at p. 16. 
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perceived as not affecting legally protected interests and as not having a perceptible 
legal effect in individual legal spheres.54 
While these premises may bring us one step closer to establishing possible 
normative links between participation and the rule of law, they are still one step away 
from laying them down. Once established, those links will flesh out the role of 
procedural standards of participation as a means of structuring and constraining the 
exercise of authority and, specifically, of subjecting administrative actors to the laws 
that bind them when acting beyond the borders of their domestic jurisdictions. 
3. The rule of law: does participation fit? 
3.1. Rule of law… 
The rule of law is a dynamic concept,55 “a contingent legal theory”.56 In a late 
modern sense, it is the product of the legal-liberal traditions shaped in the political 
and institutional history of Britain, Germany, France and the US (namely, by the 
different conceptions of the State predominant in these countries in the 19th and early 
20th centuries). Inevitably, the content of the rule of law is far from uniform and 
disagreement “extends to its core”.57 Each political context produced distinct political 
and doctrinal meanings and specific implications.58 In one reading, the rule of law 
conveys the limitation of power by law to avoid tyranny and potential abuses and 
misuses.59 Insofar as it translates as subjecting the executive power to respecting the 
law, this notion is arguably common to the different conceptions of the rule of law 
                                                                
 
 
 
54 Arguing that too much discretion is left in the hands of the executive when acting in its international 
role and on other consequences of leaving the external action of the executive unbounded, see 
Benvenisti, supra note 8, in particular pp. 184-201. 
55 Chevallier, supra note 13, pp. 12, 140; Brian Tamanaha, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, 
THEORY (Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 5. 
56 Chevallier, supra note 13, p. 9. 
57 Tamanaha, supra note 55, p. 3. 
58 Contrasting essentially the meaning of “État de droit” and “Rechstaat”, see Chevallier, supra note 
13, 13-66. On different historical and theoretical constructions, but with a stronger emphasis on the 
Anglo-Saxon traditions, see Tamanaha, supra note 55, Chapters 3 to 8. 
59 Tamanaha, supra note 55, pp. 114-5. 
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that developed in the main public law traditions of modern Europe.60 This same idea 
has also become progressively under strain since the second half of the 20th century.61  
Several qualifications have been added to this core idea of limitation of power: in 
a liberal tradition, the limitation of authority is inseverable from the protection of 
individual liberties and rights;62 inspired by social democracy, the limitation of 
authority under the rule of law serves the preservation of human dignity, justice, and 
democracy.63 Liberal conceptions tend to convey a formal meaning of the rule of law 
– stressing generality, prospectivity, stability and clarity as qualities rules ought to 
have under the paradigm of the rule of law.64 Substantive conceptions, which 
emerged more predominately in the period that followed Western totalitarian 
experiences, underline the values that inform the law and are usually associated with 
the interventionist role law acquired in the welfare state. Formal and substantive 
conceptions of the rule of law are, nevertheless, in a “symbiotic relationship”.65  
This highly concise overview of possible different meanings of the rule of law – 
unsatisfactory in many respects – inevitably falls short of heeding the richness of two 
centuries of both political and legal theoretical reflection and historical evolution. 
Including it in this article has however the purpose of supporting one argument: the 
content of the rule of law, being disputed, is also malleable. Or, more precisely, the 
core idea of the rule of law pointed out above – the limitation of power to ensure 
certain values (be it freedom, dignity, justice or democracy) – while having manifold 
                                                                
 
 
 
60 Jean Rivero, (1957), “L'Etat moderne peut-il être encore un état de droit?”, EXTRAIT DES ANNALES 
DE LA FACULTÉ DE DROIT DE LIÈGE, pp. 65-101, at 69. 
61 Rivero, supra note 60, questioning and defending the ability of the rule of law to ensure control over 
the exercise of authority and the liberty of the ‘administré’; Paulo Otero, LEGALIDADE E 
ADMINISTRAÇÃO PÚBLICA. O SENTIDO DA VINCULAÇÃO ADMINISTRATIVA À JURIDICIDADE (Coimbra: 
Almedina, 2003), pp. 137-191, and Chapter 2 of Part II. 
62 Chevallier, supra note 13, pp. 51-52; Tamanaha, supra note 55, pp. 32-36. 
63 Chevallier, supra note 13, pp.  68, 87, 88-95. 
64 Tamanaha, supra note 55, pp. 119 and 96-97.  
65 David Dyzenhaus, The rule of (administrative) law in international law, 68 LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 127-166, p. 130 (2004). Underlining that the formal-substantive 
distinction should not be overstated, see Tamanaha, supra note 55, p. 92; Chevallier, supra note 13, p. 
68. 
  
 
 
19 
implications, also entails the potential of the rule of law to adjust to changing 
realities.66 
One may still rightfully argue that the rule of law “flourished in a certain 
ideological ground, rooted in a certain social and political reality; deprived of this 
substrate, cut off from its references, [the theory of the rule of law] appears only as an 
empty shell, a formal frame and becomes itself ‘in-significant’”.67 This is a sound 
observation, which advises against too hasty extensions of the concept and theory. 
Nevertheless, even if seen as “a fragment of a civilization”, as a piece of an 
“ideological whole”,68 if kept purely within its historical state-centric context, the rule 
of law risks ignoring that the tension between authority, on the one hand, and 
autonomy that connotes a private sphere of liberty and dignity vis-à-vis the exercise 
of authority, on the other, has moved also to the transnational space, beyond the 
national and the inter-national spheres (and, within them, to sites of authority 
different from the state). It risks being “nullified by the process of transformation of 
the state”,69 and by the internal and external diffusion of power. From this 
perspective, without denying the relevance of also maintaining the rule of law within 
its less disputed realm – as referring to certainty, predictability and publicity, an 
independent judiciary, due process of law in courts, and, by extension, in 
administrative adjudicatory procedures, and other core features70 – one would rather 
                                                                
 
 
 
66 Following a substantive conception of the rule of law, endorsed here, this argument needs to be 
qualified by an important normative caveat: the transformative capacity of the rule of law relies on the 
adaptability of its content, but this can neither deny the dignity of the human person nor the institutions 
and procedures that allow one to consider a society as democratic. See Rivero, supra note 60, 100-101. 
For a different view, see, inter alia, Joseph Raz The Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 THE LAW 
QUARTERLY REVIEW, 194-211 (1977), who is critical of conceptions of the rule of law that make it 
“signify all the virtues of the state” (198). 
67 Chevallier, supra note 13, p. 50, author’s translation. 
68 Rivero, supra note 60, p. 101, author’s translation. 
69 Chevallier, supra note 13, p. 12. As mentioned, while this article focuses on internationalized 
administrative procedures, this reasoning also applies to transformations of public authority within the 
state (see supra note 52). 
70 See the lists drawn by Lon Fuller, THE MORALITY OF LAW (Yale University Press, 1964), Chapter 2; 
Raz, supra note 66, pp. 198-202. 
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stress the “evolving nature” of the rule of law and, on this premise, inquire into its 
capacity to frame more recent transformations of public authority.71  
For current purposes, the inquiry into the possible transformations of the rule of 
law focuses on procedural standards of participation and on a procedural meaning of 
the rule of law – one that zooms in law-generating processes and how they are 
constructed when initiated in inter- and transnational settings. In itself, this focus may 
be contentious. Analyzing law-generating processes rather than law-applying 
processes from the perspective of the rule of law may be criticized on the ground that 
the rule of law is not about the making of the law, but about its qualities and, if at all 
about process, then about processes of law application.72 Yet, in the type of situations 
exemplified in the beginning of the article, the actors involved are at the same time 
law-makers and law-appliers and, in the former process, they condition the choices 
they follow in the latter. In addition, given the looser constraints of internationalized 
procedures, the limited judicial purview over the links between internal and external 
procedures and the virtual absence of public scrutiny of external regulatory activities, 
executive actors defining regulatory acts at the inter- and transnational level may 
more easily take biased decisions that have nonetheless a significant impact on 
internal law and on natural and legal persons.73 
3.2. …and participation 
The two poles mentioned – a procedural conception of the rule of law and 
participation – can be bridged by focusing on one of the core procedural principles of 
the rule of law (core, at least, in the common law world, but also, by English 
influence, in EU law): no one should be subject to a penalty or a serious loss resulting 
from unilateral public action without being given the opportunity to put forth their 
                                                                
 
 
 
71 Similarly, albeit drawing different implications from the argument, see Palombella, who stresses: 
“the ideal of the rule of law might also require different incarnations that are better suited to realizing 
its normative rationale against a background of changing social settings” (Gianluigi Pallombella, The 
Rule of Law and its Core, in RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW (Gianluigi Palombella and Neil Walker, 
eds., Hart Publishing, 2009) 17-42, pp.  39-40). 
72 Jeremy Waldron, The rule of law and the importance of procedure in GETTING TO THE RULE OF 
LAW, (James E. Fleming ed., New York University Press, 2011) 3-31, pp. 7-12. Waldron defends a 
procedural conception of the rule of law but he has in mind courts as law-appliers. 
73 See Benvenisti, supra note 8, in particular pp. 171-175. 
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views on the facts adduced and legal norms relevant to the case. There are two 
distinct perspectives on this principle. From one point of view, its only translation in 
administrative-type procedures is the right to be heard and its ancillary rights. As a 
guarantee of adjudicatory procedures, the right to be heard is pertinent outside the 
courtroom only when the application of the law to a particular situation implies the 
adoption of a measure that can have adverse effects in the legal sphere of its 
addressees (typically, a sanction or a measure having a similar effect). Therefore, this 
principle is totally alien to the empirical reality that grounds the present normative 
analysis. This position is defensible. It has the support of administrative laws in many 
EU countries, where as a matter of principle, and despite the extensions in its scope 
of application, the right to be heard does not apply to procedures leading to the 
adoption of general acts.74 If coupled with a so-called “thin conception” of the rule of 
law, such as the one defended by Raz, this view closes definitively the path this 
article proposes to explore (that is, the possibility of reading participation in the light 
of the rule of law). When applied to the examples mentioned in the beginning of this 
article, the proponents of this conception may likely argue that the rule of law is the 
rule of the law.75 In one of the examples mentioned, there is hardly any law to 
account for (ICH rule-making is very thinly covered by legal rules);76 in the other, the 
legal rules that are side-stepped by effect of reception of ICCAT recommendations 
enshrine duties of consultation of stakeholders created to compensate the 
shortcomings in the knowledge resources of policy-makers.77 In addition, they would 
maintain that arguments for control of law-making by non-elected bodies have 
nothing to do with the rule of law.78 Therefore, even admitting that a procedural 
conception of the rule of law could be defended, there is no way of linking it to the 
procedural standards of participation that form the object of the present analysis. 
                                                                
 
 
 
74 Mendes, PARTICIPATION IN EU RULE-MAKING, supra note 38, pp. 46-58. 
75 According to Raz, “‘the rule of law’ means literally what it says: [t]he rule of the law” supra note 
66,  p. 196. 
76 In the case of the EU, only article art. 57(1)(j) of Regulation No. 726/2004 (supra note 26). From a 
formal perspective, the ICH and the EMA rules of procedure can hardly be considered “law”. 
77 Recital 27 of Council Regulation No 2371/2002, supra note 19. 
78 Raz, supra note 66, p. 200. 
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From another perspective, the principle mentioned above can be extended to cover 
participation in procedures leading to the adoption of general acts.79 It does not 
translate merely into the right to be heard in adjudicatory procedures, but, arguably, it 
stresses more broadly “the value we place on government treating ordinary citizens 
with respect as active centers of intelligence”,80 irrespective of the form the action of 
public authority takes.81 This is also in line with the idea of the person as bearer of 
fundamental rights: while subject to the exercise of public authority, the person must 
be treated in a way that respects him or her as a member of the collectivity and holder 
of rights.82 Their dignity would be respected when the persons subject to authority are 
not treated merely as objects of decisions that interfere with their legal spheres. In 
this procedural reading, the rule of law “requires that public institutions sponsor and 
facilitate reasoned argument in public affairs”.83  Respect for dignity requires an 
opportunity for argumentation.84 The freedom the rule of law protects is then a 
“positive freedom: active engagement in the administration of public affairs, the 
freedom to participate actively and argumentatively in the way one is governed”.85 
Arguably, pursuing it requires the subjection of public authority to legal rules that 
structure its exercise accordingly. In constraining decision-makers to engage with 
those who bear the effects of their decisions, these rules can ensure due consideration 
for the (individual, collective and diffuse) legally protected interests affected by 
public policy.86 They thereby force decision-makers to consider the views voiced, to 
                                                                
 
 
 
79 Mendes, PARTICIPATION IN EU RULE-MAKING, supra note 38, pp. 58-70, 76-77, and 229-240. 
80 Waldron, supra note 72, p. 22.  
81 Mashaw points out that “as contemporary administrative acitivity (…) moves increasingly toward 
the use of generally applicable rules, a due process jurisprudence oriented to the protection of rights 
through adjudication, rather than toward the ways rights are created by quasi-legislative processes, 
appears impoverished”  (Mashaw, supra note 48, p. 896). 
82 Dyzenhaus, supra note 65, p. 135. This is different from necessarily associating the rule of law with 
respect for fundamental rights. 
83 Waldron, supra note 72, p. 19. 
84 Waldron, supra note 72, p. 20. Waldron’s analysis focus on the tension between this strand of 
dignity and other strands of dignity associated to the rule of law that emphasize certainty and 
predictability (Waldron, supra note 72, pp. 18-23). More broadly, on the values underlying a concern 
for dignity in the realm of public law procedures, see Mashaw, supra note 48, at p. 886, and on the 
challenges of a dignitarian perspective, idem, pp. 898-9. 
85 Waldron, supra note 72, p. 20.  
86 In a similar sense, Dyzenhaus, supra note 65, pp. 129-130. For a critique of this way of conceiving 
the function of law, see West, The Limits of Process in Fleming, GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW, supra 
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the extent that they are relevant to the interests legally protected, and, thereby, create 
the conditions to protect the dignity of those affected (in the sense mentioned above) 
and the material justice of public acts. Procedural rules ought then be connected to 
substantive legally protected interests.87 This is one conception on the basis of which 
different rules can be set up, depending on the constraining character of the acts 
adopted (which needs to be determined taking into account the regulatory cycle in 
which they are produced), on the type of power being exercised, on the normative 
desirability and effective possibility of introducing legal rules in a given regulatory 
forum, on the trade offs that such rules could have. 
Implicit in this procedural conception of the rule of law is the idea that procedural 
rules need at least to be considered in the creation of regulatory regimes, even if at 
the end they may not be introduced because the possible disadvantages are likely to 
overcome the advantages. Participatory procedures might not be beneficial in every 
circumstance.88 Their risks and possible disadvantages are well-known. Among 
others, the juridification of participation entails risks because it introduces a different 
logic and purpose both in the mechanisms of participation and in regulatory 
processes.89 It may risk disrupting otherwise functional regulatory processes, since it 
may be inadequate to the specific ways of coordinating a variety of decisions and 
actors. Risks of capture, in particular by powerful corporate actors, are likely 
amplified in inter- and transnational settings where representation of diffuse interests 
(e.g. environment, consumer protection) is potentially weaker than nationally or 
locally, and institutional structures are looser than at the state level.90 At the same 
time, procedures and their respective standards lend a sense of legitimacy to the 
exercise of authority that ultimately reinforces it,91 instead of opening up possibilities 
of contestation and control, as defended above. Obstacles to practical feasibility; the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
 
note 72, pp. 32-51, at 47-49 (to which one may counter-argue that a focus on the tension authority- 
liberty/dignity does not exhaust the function of law). 
87 See Section 1, on the legal meaning of participation. 
88 Balancing the disadvantages of introducing procedural rules at the global level, but cautiously 
defending this option, see Giacinto della Cananea, Procedural Due Process of Law Beyond the State, 
in Bogdandy et al. THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY supra note 7, 965, at pp. 972-78.  
89 Chevallier, supra note 13, p. 65. 
90 See Benvenisti, supra note 8, who however argues that procedures can be a tool to reduce capture. 
91 Chevallier, supra note 13, pp. 62-65; West, The Limits of Process, supra note 86, p. 42. 
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difficulties in ensuring adequate links of representation within interest 
representatives; the lack of adequate enforcement mechanisms that would secure a 
well functioning procedure, are other critical points of participatory procedures. 
These risks and potential disadvantages advise against all-encompassing solutions 
and point to the need to strike “delicate balances” in specific regulatory contexts, 
taking into account the different realities to which procedures would apply.92 They do 
not, however, constitute a principled objection to the introduction of procedural rules 
of participation capable of upholding the rule of law, in the sense indicated above. 
Using the image of concentric circles, one is certainly closer to the rule of law – in 
the procedural sense indicated above – when the act originating in the inter- and 
trans-national sphere is an individualized determination, the potential addressees of 
which, or affected persons, can easily be identified. It is this type of situations 
Waldron considered in his proposal for a procedural conception of the rule of law – 
the opportunity to make arguments about what the law is and ought to be in cases 
where authority has a direct bearing on the person.93 But, within certain conditions, 
the procedural conception of the rule of law proposed is capable of encompassing the 
participation of holders of rights and legally protected interests affected by general 
acts, that is, by law-making type of procedures.94 These type of situations would then 
constitute an outer circle, where the exercise of authority does not have a direct 
bearing on individuals – an effect that will nevertheless occur via a follow up 
decision adopted elsewhere – but where the law is defined for more or less precise 
instances of regulation, with more or less detail regarding the specific entitlements 
and duties that emerge therefrom.95 In between the core and the outer circle there may 
be potentially a great variety of situations.  
In the outer circle, the possibility of harm being produced that may ultimately have 
a detrimental impact on individual legal spheres cannot be excluded. The lack of 
                                                                
 
 
 
92 Benvenisti, supra note 8, pp. 204-211. 
93 Waldron, supra note 72, pp. 19, 24 and 26. In his analysis, he specifically considers situations where 
the law is being administered in judicial procedures, although he does not exclude the possibility of 
such a procedural conception of the rule of law having broader application. 
94 For more detail, see Mendes PARTICIPATION IN EU RULE-MAKING, supra note 38, pp. 61-70, 229-
240. 
95 Similarly, Mendes, PARTICIPATION IN EU RULE-MAKING, supra note 38, pp. 229-240 
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consideration, or a manifest disproportionate weighing of competing legally protected 
interests can lead to such an effect.96 Issues of dignity can also be involved when 
decisions are adopted without due consideration of the interests concerned, which, by 
legal determination, ought to be balanced – and not only when rules are unclear, 
unstable, and retrospective.97 Arguably, if accompanied by requirements of 
justification, participation in the adoption of this type of decisions would favor the 
balancing of competing legally protected interests, and, in doing so, avoid 
compromising the material justice of the ensuing decisions.98 While the opportunity 
of reasoned argumentation in shaping a rule or decision does not in itself guarantee 
this outcome, it creates the conditions to avoid biased, possibly self-interest, acts that 
deny material justice. 
However, this is the point where the boundaries that could delimit a procedural 
conception of the rule of law, on the one hand, from a democracy argument that 
would ground the democratic legitimacy of decision-making on the search for the 
most adequate solution via an argumentative process, on the other, and also from 
participation as a governance principle, risks becoming blurred. At the same time, 
this is also the point from where on one can identify the situations in which the 
coordination between public and private actors that join efforts in decision-making 
procedures standing at the margins of law – or squarely falling outside its realm – 
should be subject to legal principles and rules inspired by a procedural conception of 
the rule of law. 
3.3. Still rule of law? 
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Would the subjection to procedural rules that structure the exercise of authority in 
such situations still be part of the rule of law? Already in the late 1970s, Raz argued: 
“we have reached the stage in which no purist can claim that truth is on his side and 
blame the others of distorting the notion of the rule of law”.99 Participation can be, 
and is usually, defended on grounds different from the rule of law – transparency and 
participation of the public (democracy inspired argument), or as an instrument to 
achieve better regulatory outcomes that leaves the choices of participation fully in the 
hands of the decision-maker (governance). From a legal perspective, it is justified by 
the need to limit the exercise of authority due to the legal effects of the decisions 
adopted by a public authority.100 Whether participation in the latter sense can be 
considered from a rule of law perspective, is debatable. One may argue that invoking 
the rule of law in this case may only amount to invoking the symbolic meaning of 
this principle. However, the above analysis shows that the purpose of making a rule 
of law claim is within the “rule of law ethos”, if this is perceived as encompassing the 
protection of the dignity of the person and the material justice of public acts, in the 
sense proposed. Participation can ensure that the persons affected by decisions of 
public authority (irrespective of their form) are treated in their autonomy as members 
of a collectivity and holders of rights, rather than as objects of decisions that are alien 
to them. Insofar as this is the case, participation is a legal tool to structure and 
constrain the exercise of authority. 
Returning to the examples mentioned in the beginning of this article, harm to 
legally protected interests that ultimately may have a detrimental impact on 
individual legal spheres can result from the regulatory cycles initiated by the adoption 
of ICH guidelines and of ICCAT recommendations. The procedures through which 
the initial decisions are adopted do not entail procedural guarantees that ensure the 
due consideration of the interests protected by the laws of the participating entities (in 
the case analyzed, the EU). As mentioned, they are later applied in the domestic legal 
order as adopted in inter- and trans-national fora, via decisions that concretize their 
legal effect in the legal sphere of those concerned, which in turn are adopted through 
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procedures that also do not entail such guarantees. As an effect of the reception of 
inter- and trans-national decisions, the holders of the legally protected interests 
concerned may suffer harm as a result of unilateral public action (in this case, 
intertwined decision-making adopted at different levels of governance) without being 
given the possibility of – via interest representatives – putting forth their views, and 
without procedural guarantees that the legally protected interests they hold have been 
balanced by the decision-makers. At stake are interests that are legally protected in 
the EU also in the form of fundamental rights, the pursuance of which is dependent 
on technical and scientific issues such as those decided via internationalized 
rulemaking procedures.101 From an objective perspective – that is, one that detaches 
from the individual situation of the persons affected – there is a dearth of procedural 
mechanisms that ensure that the discretion exercised via these regulatory processes is 
structured and authority constrained in a way that it complies with the law to which 
administrative entities are bound, while the legal effects of their decisions in legally 
protected interests are potentially significant. Arguably, this result contradicts the 
values conveyed by the rule of law, as approached above. 
It is this aspect – the capacity of procedural standards to structure discretion and 
constrain the exercise of authority – that risks being depleted by the effect of the 
interaction of legal regimes. One problem with this construction is that also within 
the EU the procedural standards that are depleted as a result of reception are not legal 
guarantees. What would be depleted then? At first sight, procedural standards of 
participation established in the realm of governance, outside legal parameters stricto 
sensu, that only due to a stretch of imagination could possibly be read with a rule of 
law lens. Nevertheless, the procedural rules that allow for participation in the 
decision-making procedures analyzed can have the effect of structuring and, hence, 
limiting authority. Certainly, a concern for constraining authority is not the main 
reason why they were created in the first place.102 However, the way they have 
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developed – at least as far as this can be determined on the basis of written procedural 
rules enshrined in Commission Communications and agency’s rules of procedure 
applicable in the cases mentioned – does not differ in essence from legally binding 
rules of notice and comment that would constrain the procedures to which they 
apply.103 In this sense, they have at least the capacity of constraining the exercise of 
authority. This assertion neither means that they cannot be critically assessed in the 
light of this aim, improved to better ensure it, nor that this is actually the effect they 
have. On the contrary, it sheds a critical light also on the procedural rules followed 
within the EU. The difference between governance or administrative practices and 
legally binding procedures remains the origin of such rules and the consequences of 
non-compliance – voluntarily followed practices (self-constrain), in one case, 
externally determined legal rules that can be enforced via judicial review, in the 
other. Admittedly, not in all cases there are legal arguments to defend that the 
transition from one model to the other ought to be made.104 At any rate, it is precisely 
this capacity that one cannot identify in the procedural rules that apply to decision-
making procedures developed in the corresponding international and transnational 
spaces analyzed, to which substantive decisions are effectively transferred by effect 
of international agreements or international regulatory cooperation. They are weaker 
because, in one case, there is no legal determination according to which interest 
representatives should be consulted, and logically also no duty to take the views 
received into account, contrary to the EU procedural rules that would otherwise apply 
(fisheries); in the other case, there seems to be no concern regarding the feedback to 
be given to the participants neither public explanations on the options finally 
followed (medicines). The value of participation remains in the shade, since it is 
hardly possible for interested persons to assess how their contribution was treated, 
which in turn compromises the ability of the respective procedures to structure 
discretion and constrain the exercise of authority. 
Procedural standards of participation (accompanied by guarantees of justification) 
may be as good as it gets in terms of structuring and constraining the exercise of 
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authority in areas of regulation where the role of law is unclear, whether they include 
the reception of international and transnational decisions or not. At stake is the 
limitation of authority that is characteristic of a legal system that purports to obey to 
the rule of law and that is concerned with structuring the discretion of administrative 
decision-makers. What one then misses (what is depleted) is one of the mechanisms 
that constrain decision-makers to justify their decisions in the light of the public 
interests they are legally bound to pursue. 
4. The transformative potential of a rule of law inspired 
perspective: reconceptualizing decision-making procedures? 
If the depletion of procedural standards of participation by effect of reception of 
decisions adopted within inter- and trans-national regulatory regimes can be 
perceived as a problem of rule of law, which consequences follow? Which 
adjustments and variations to the procedural rules that are practiced in transnational 
spaces would this perspective require? There are two different, but related aspects to 
this question. First, as implied above, approaching participation from the perspective 
of the rule of law requires reinterpreting processes and mechanisms that were 
introduced in decision-making with purposes that are far from an ideal of 
constraining authority or, even more so, from a concern of respecting “the freedom to 
participate actively and argumentatively in the way one is governed”, to use again 
Waldron’s terms.105 It requires reinterpreting them in legal terms, transforming 
current practices into rules that would limit public authority, therefore, creating 
legality (or quasi-legality) where thus far it has not existed. Indeed, the very reason 
for approaching participation from a rule of law inspired perspective is the 
subordination of the exercise of authority to law via procedural constrains of legal 
nature or via constraints that can be considered functionally equivalent, even if they 
remain formally different. Secondly, what would such a transformation imply in 
international and transnational settings? These two aspects point to two related 
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consequences: a change in approaching the procedural standards that are currently in 
place, and a change in approaching the procedures where they apply. 
The transformation of the procedural standards would occur along the lines 
indicated above. As argued, in instances where the exercise of public authority is at 
stake and, in addition, holders of the legally protected interests concerned may suffer 
harm as a result of unilateral public action, participation as a part of governance 
discourses and participation inspired by a rule of law perspective could and should be 
bridged. The decision-making procedure should entail guarantees that the decision-
makers duly balance the legally protected interests concerned. These may be legal 
guarantees, sanctioned by law, or may stem from institutional practices that, 
nevertheless, have the capacity of constraining the exercise of authority through 
means other than the law. The precise shape of these guarantees would depend on a 
variety of factors.106 Moreover, the advantages of their introduction would need to be 
balanced against their possible disadvantages in the concrete regulatory settings at 
issue.107 That claim points to the need to, at least, preserve the procedural standards 
that are capable of structuring the decision-makers’ discretion, and hence, of 
constraining the authority they exercise when adopting general acts – the ones 
depleted as an effect of reception of international decisions. But it also indicates that 
the EU procedures themselves ought to be re-thought in the light of this conception, 
with a view to ensuring that self-imposed procedural rules may function as effective 
constraints, and do not merely coat decision-making with a veil of legitimacy. 
This leads us to the second consequence mentioned. Advocating this 
transformation postulates also a new way of approaching procedures, for two reasons. 
First, the transformation of procedural standards is defended in the adoption of acts 
that, irrespective of their source or form, entail the exercise of public authority. In the 
cases analyzed above, such instances can only be properly identified if one takes into 
account the external links of decision-making procedures. This point has been made 
above.108 Second, if procedures continue to be viewed in segmented terms, i.e. only 
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in their horizontal dimension, possible solutions to constraining the exercise of 
authority face considerable hurdles or are unsatisfactory, for the reasons explained 
next. 
If one takes an horizontal view on internationalized procedures, separately 
analyzing their global and domestic (in our case, European) levels, the normative 
perspective defended above would lead to one of three possible claims: first, 
procedural standards that structure the administrative discretion and, hence, limit the 
exercise of authority, need to be introduced in international and transnational law-
making procedures (centralized solution); second, and alternatively, when pursuing 
international activities, EU bodies and institutions ought to be bound, internally, by 
the same procedural rules that apply when there are no instances of reception 
(decentralized solution); thirdly, both solutions need to be followed (combined 
solution). 
The centralized solution raises one important objection: the procedures currently 
in place in those regulatory fora may be adequate to the type of decisions that are 
therein adopted. As mentioned above, the problem of unrestrained authority may only 
emerge from the vertical effects of these decisions. Therefore, one may argue that the 
problem lies only down the regulatory chain, hence, it is a problem of how these 
decisions are received – in other words, a problem of the domestic legal systems. If at 
all, changes would be needed there. Should one still agree that the procedural 
standards practiced in international and transnational fora should be changed, it 
would follow from the normative perspective defended above that such standards 
would need to be constructed in a highly complex way. They would need to 
accommodate the legally protected interests of the legal orders of the participating 
members, and consider the possible harmful effects of their decisions in third 
countries that suffer the effect of the decisions adopted. The potential complexity of 
this solution could block decision-making, rendering it ultimately both unfeasible and 
undesirable.  
The decentralized solution would be the suitable alternative, given that the 
problem lies in the domestic legal orders. It is the legal orders where the depletion of 
procedural guarantees may be problematic that would need to adjust their 
mechanisms of reception. But this solution is equally unsatisfactory. First, the 
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argument overlooks that the domestic legal systems are either legally bound by the 
substantive decisions adopted externally, or simply follow them for reasons of 
administrative convenience. Introducing procedural guarantees at the moment of 
reception would very likely be a window-dressing exercise, since it would be 
incapable of impacting in any way on substantive decisions already adopted 
elsewhere.109 Alternatively, it would place the domestic authorities in a difficult 
position, since they would face the possibility of needing to refuse reception (on legal 
grounds) if this would mean a deviation from their own law. The latter option is 
unrealistic. Domestic authorities in charge of reception are often the same that have 
made the external decisions they then receive (which does not mean they will duly 
consider the legally protected interests they are bound to respect internally). 
Therefore, they will not be prone to setting aside the external decision, for procedural 
or substantive reasons. Domestic authorities will probably more easily use the 
argument that “unfiltered” reception (i.e. not subject to further internal procedural 
guarantees) is the result of their international duties, and compliance with the latter 
justifies that they do not follow procedures that would be practiced internally, as the 
example of reception of ICCAT decisions demonstrates.110 The decentralized solution 
is unsatisfactory for a second, related reason. The insistence on a domestic – internal 
– perspective, if at all, can only solve problems of depletion of procedural guarantees 
within the domestic legal system (in our case, the EU). It only alerts to an internal 
problem of consistency,111 in which case possible normative solutions following the 
views defended above would fail to address the problem of unrestrained authority in 
internationalized rulemaking. As pointed out, the challenge of creating adequate 
procedural guarantees may lay in the exit options that external regulatory fora 
provide, as the ICH example shows, or in the very approach of domestic authorities 
regarding their international role and obligations. 
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The combined solution is compromised by the fact that it would still rely on a 
multi-level approach, which, for the reasons stated above, is unsuitable to address the 
problem of unrestrained authority addressed in this article. It does not escape the 
problems of the centralized and of the decentralized solution, namely because it 
would follow an horizontal-segmented perspective on the decision-making occurring 
at each level, and, thereby, it would likely overlook the fact that the actors involved 
in the different regulatory stages may be the same using with “different hats”.  
If decision-making procedures are in essence neither European nor international, 
as the examples show, international regulatory activities are then better perceived as a 
continuation of internal activities, and vice-versa,112 rather than a separate, 
diplomatic-type or necessarily expert-dominated fora. This leads us to stress a point 
made above: one needs to focus on the functional inter-dependence of regulatory 
decisions adopted at the inter- or transnational level and at the EU level, and, 
therefore, search for the external links of decision-making procedures. Thinking of 
international regulatory cooperation from the perspective of the links between the 
different procedures that support it has the advantage of capturing the entirety of the 
regulatory chain that is triggered by decisions adopted in global regulatory fora and 
given effect at the regional and national levels. Focusing on their links, across legal 
systems, contributes to assessing the legal relevance of normative acts adopted at 
different levels of governance, the legal value of which may be questionable on 
formal legal grounds (for example, informal legal acts may eventually be considered 
as preparatory acts of a final decision, adopted at a different regulatory level). This 
holistic view enables a better grasp of the reality of international or transnational 
regulation and a better perception of the problems involved, highlighting their 
effective impact on legally protected interests and, possibly, on the legal spheres of 
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natural and legal persons. The decision-making procedures that operate the 
substantive coordination of the legal systems involved ought to be seen as segments 
of a broader regulatory cycle. This perspective may lead one to questioning whether 
domestic procedures are as autonomous as they appear to be when seen in isolation 
from those external links. Ultimately, this line of thought may lead to re-
conceptualizing decision-making procedures, with a view to ensuring that the 
exercise of public authority that results from international regulatory cooperation 
remains structured and constrained by law or by quasi-legal institutional practices 
that are functionally equivalent to legal procedural guarantees.113 
4.1. Composite procedures 
Highlighting the external links of decision-making procedures created by effect of 
international regulatory cooperation evokes composite administrative procedures.114 
Composite procedures involve decisions of different bodies or entities – that in the 
case of internationalized procedures are situated outside one legal system or 
regulatory regime – and therefore encompass one or more intertwined sub-procedures 
that are functional to the adoption of a final decision. The concept has been used in 
EU legal scholarship not only to describe the functional interdependences of 
decisions taken by different EU and national regulatory bodies, but also to highlight 
the problems of legal protection arising from the allocation of such procedures to 
different jurisdictions.115 The same concept may be useful to capture the reality of 
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substantive regulation that depends on the confluence of decisions adopted at the 
inter- or transnational level and at the EU level. It may allow the interpreter to focus 
on the decisive moments of the definition of the content of regulatory acts, and, on 
this basis, redefine accordingly the role law should have in the respective regulatory 
cycle. For instance, when procedural rules are defined for the establishment of fishing 
quotas within the EU – whether policy-oriented or not – it can hardly be ignored that 
many of these measures may be pre-defined by Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations (RFMOs). When total allowable catches are transposed into EU law, 
they are not subject to the rules of participation functionally equivalent to those that 
apply to similar substantive decisions adopted purely within the EU.116 Is such a 
situation normatively justified? Are the rules of procedure that guide decision-making 
of the RFMOs Fisheries Commissions designed with a view to structure the exercise 
of public authority in a way that complies with requirements of the rule of law that 
are valid within the legal orders of the RFMOs member states? Ought they not be in 
view of the vertical effects they produce? By approaching this instance of regulation 
from the angle of composite procedures, the interpreter is led to questioning the 
effects that international regulatory collaboration may have in legal guarantees valid 
within the legal systems that serve such collaboration. More importantly, focusing on 
the links between what may be segments of a broader regulatory cycle may lead, in 
some cases, to defending the juridification of the segments of the composite 
procedures where the substantive decisions are effectively shaped.117  
Yet, using composite administrative procedures as an analytical tool may open 
more questions than it gives solutions. If the term is used as developed in EU 
administrative law literature, composite administrative procedures require, first, a 
legal connection on the basis of which one may establish that the coordination of 
different administrative actors is directed at one final outcome;118 secondly, they 
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require the lack of autonomy of the sub-procedures that compose them, due to their 
structural connectedness.119 There is no necessity to transpose these two 
characteristics to a possible conceptualization of composite procedures in the context 
of international cooperation.120 “Composite procedures” is not an established legal 
term and using it in a different setting opens the way for different 
conceptualizations.121 Nevertheless, they indicate the conceptual difficulty of 
analyzing internationalized procedures as composite. In the context of international 
regulatory cooperation, what are the legal links on the basis of which a sufficient 
interdependence can be established? More importantly, would it be possible, on the 
basis of such links, to identify the moment (or moments) in which the content of the 
regulatory decisions is defined, and propose, accordingly, a re-definition of the 
procedural guarantees within the overall composite procedure? This latter question 
points to a normative difficulty: would composite administrative procedures be an 
effective tool in ensuring that the exercise of authority would be constrained by 
procedure? It should be reminded that in the EU’s integrated administrative system, 
such procedures remain a challenge to legal protection. Legislative acts may design 
procedures that combine the regulatory decisions adopted by EU and national 
authorities, but the scope of procedural rules remains separate. The segments of 
composite administrative procedures developed at the national level are subject 
primarily to national rules of procedure, but also to EU law; those developed at the 
EU level are subject to EU rules of procedure.122 Procedural rules that ensure 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
 
2nd ed, 652-53 (1988). On the notion of administrative procedure, as requiring the production of one 
final outcome, Giannini, pp. 529-30. 
119 On the lack of autonomy of sub-procedures as a distinctive feature of composite administrative 
procedures, see Luis F. Maseo Seco (2004), I procedimenti composti comunitari: riflessioni intorno 
alla problematica della impossibilità di difendersi ed eventuali alternative in I PROCEDIMENTI 
AMMINISTRATIVI DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA. UN’INDAGINE. ATTI DEL CONVEGNO (Studio, Urbino, 
Giacinto Cananea and Matteo Gnes, eds, 2003), Torino: Giappichelli, pp. 11-32, at pp. 17-18, drawing 
on Parejo Alfonso et al., 1 MANUAL DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO (Barcelona, Ariel, 1998) 551-603 
p. 559). 
120 I am grateful to Benedict Kingsbury for this point. 
121 See Bogdandy and Dann’s analysis with regard to composite administration (supra note 112). 
122 Jacques Ziller, Exécution centralisée et execution partagée: Le fédéralisme d’exécution en droit de 
l’Union Européenne, in L’EXECUTION DU DROIT DE L’UNION, ENTRE MÉCANISMES 
COMMUNAUTAIRES AND DROIT NATIONAUX, (Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, ed., Bruylant, 2009) 
111-138, at p. 127-8. 
  
 
 
37 
participation tend to fall through the mesh that supports the administrative 
collaboration between national and EU administrations.123 In the international and 
transnational sphere, when considering the interlinks between different legal systems 
and regulatory regimes outside integrated administrative structures, the possibility 
that constructing decision-making procedures as composite would have normative 
effects of the type envisaged here is even dimmer.  
These difficulties and open questions do not deny per se the explanatory value of 
this approach. For the reasons indicated above, it can be a useful starting point to 
addressing the normative problems that emerge from internationalized procedures. 
Using the lens of composite procedures highlights that structuring and constraining 
the exercise of authority may “entail a complex structure, capable of functioning at 
various levels (…) of including all the relevant actors (…) and of organizing various 
sub-sectors”.124 But it requires an analysis that cannot be further developed here. 
4.2. Actors and their procedural duties 
Another way of avoiding a level-segmented conception of procedural rules and their 
depletion is to focus on the actors involved in the regulatory cycle and on the legal 
and institutional requirements valid within their legal systems. The members of 
international or transnational regulatory fora, insofar as they represent public entities, 
are bound by formal and informal rules that shape their procedural behavior and their 
substantive decisions. These are valid within their legal orders, but to the extent that 
their international regulatory functions are a continuation of their internal regulatory 
functions, such rules should also bind their external actions. Moving decision-making 
from one forum to another cannot a priori lead to sidestepping those rules. Focusing 
on the EU and on the examples used in this article, EU representatives in Regional 
Fisheries Management Organizations, among other rules, are bound by the basic 
regulation that defines the legally protected interests and the governance principles 
valid in that field act within the EU Common Fisheries Policy. The EMA acting in its 
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external role, when sitting in the ICH expert committee, is bound by the substantive 
requirements of the EU pharmaceutical law and should also by bound by rules of 
procedure it defined in order to respond to claims of legitimacy and accountability of 
its constituencies.125 Focusing on the EU’s responsibility as an external actor in the 
sense proposed, highlighting the need for consistency between its external action and 
its internal policies (in line with what is prescribed now in article 21(3) TEU) would 
have both internal and external consequences.  
Given the eventual domestic ramifications of the decisions the EU co-authors 
externally, deviations from internal substantive and procedural rules ought to be 
justified internally. EU decision-makers ought to demonstrate that the decisions 
adopted externally – or, at least, what the EU strove for in their adoption – do not 
contradict the content of the law by which they are bound. Deviations may of course 
be required by the very fact that these decision-makers are members of inter- and 
transnational regulatory fora. Also new issues not envisaged in the laws of the 
participating members are likely to arise. But their external decisions and actions 
should still be subsumed under the constitutional and legislative framework under 
which they operate. Justification, as proposed above, would ensure that link. In 
addition, stressing the functional interconnectedness between these external decisions 
and the internal decisions of reception would create the conditions to identifying the 
situations in which the external decisions may have a detrimental effect to legally 
protected interests, through a regulatory chain of interwoven decisions. This may 
require the transformation of internal procedural standards, if not by adjusting the 
possibilities of participation accordingly, by strengthening the requirements of 
justification, which would need to take this effect into account. This is different from 
introducing procedural guarantees at the level of reception that would potentially 
mirror equivalent internal decision-making procedures. As pointed out above, these 
would hardly function as filters for depletion. The procedural adjustment of the type 
proposed here would apply to the external action of domestic actors, eventually 
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piercing inter- and transnational decision-making procedures.126 Justification, as 
envisaged here, is important because reason giving creates the conditions for 
contestation and control, but it can also avoid treating the holders of legally protected 
interests merely as objects of decision-making.127 Ultimately, the emphasis on 
procedural duties of EU institutions and bodies acting in an external role would 
structure their administrative discretion and avoid “exit ways” that could lead to 
instances of unrestrained authority.128 
This way of conceiving the external conduct of domestic administrative actors 
would be consequential externally. If applicable to domestic administrative actors of 
other jurisdictions gathered in inter- and transnational regulatory fora, the effect 
would be multiplied. It would then lead to a web of justification that enables legal 
and political control over the external role of those actors, in the light of the internal 
laws that bind them. Whether that would be capable of impacting on the procedures 
followed within those fora in a meaningful way is another matter.129 Meaningful, 
from the normative perspective of this article, would mean finding an adequate way 
of structuring discretion and constraining authority in internationalized procedures, 
which would capture the vertical effects of inter- and transnational decisions. 
Addressing this point would need a deeper understanding of the functioning of these 
fora, of what it means for the participating members to act under the law, of how 
incompatible claims inherent to the laws of the participating members could be 
articulated and which consequences such articulation would entail.130 However, it is 
plausible that, if internally constrained by duties of justification that link their 
external actions back to the substantive and procedural rules that bind them 
internally, these actors may be pressured also to adjust inter- and transnational 
                                                                
 
 
 
126 See, for example, the proposal regarding article 218(9) TFEU, and respective challenges, in 
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understandable reason giving” – Mashaw, Reasoned Administration…, supra note 98, p. 118. See also, 
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128 On the consequences of such “exit ways”, see Benvenisti, supra note 8.  
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decision-making procedures to comply with the same claims of legitimacy they face 
internally.131 Internal procedural constrains regarding external regulatory actions of 
domestic actors could therefore contribute to transform inter- and transnational 
procedures, given the functional links of the respective decisions. While it would be 
impossible to accommodate all legitimacy claims stemming from the internal laws of 
the participating members, it is arguably unlikely that such claims would not have 
any impact upward in the regulatory chain.132 Admittedly, the pull towards different 
procedural rules will most probably come from the most powerful actors in the inter- 
and transnational scene, eventually spurring criticisms of Americanization or 
Europeanization of procedures.133 But this observation only timidly lifts the veil of 
the more complex factors and incentives that influence decision-making and the 
relations between actors within the varied inter- and transnational regulatory fora.134 
5. Conclusions 
Regulatory decisions ensuing from decision-making procedures developed at 
different governance levels may be interlinked in such a way that it may be artificial 
to ascribe them to distinct legal systems. The argument is not new.135 Yet, hitherto, 
the discussion on the internationalization of EU and national administrative 
procedures, having highlighted the external ramifications of internal regulatory 
decisions, has to a large extent ignored the impact that such internationalization has 
on procedural guarantees that structure administrative discretion and, hence, constrain 
                                                                
 
 
 
131 Defending that decision-making in international institutions should reflect the interplay between 
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administrative law in international institutions, 68 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 319 (2012). 
Arguing that, in the case of the ICH, a bottom up insistence on good administrative practices would be 
the most efficient way to bind network, despite the limitations such approach would have from an 
accountability perspective, see Berman, supra note 28, in particular pp. 15, 25-30. 
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public authority exercised through general regulatory acts of varied legal nature and 
form.136 Taking as a starting point the author’s previous research on this matter, this 
article has queried whether internationalized rulemaking procedures may constitute 
instances of unrestrained authority and whether they may, as such, defy the premise 
according to which law ought to ground and limit public authority, upsetting the 
difficult balance between discretion and law, eventually tipping it to discretion. 
Focusing only on the way decisions are formed as a result of a combination of a 
series of acts adopted in inter-, trans- and supranational fora – therefore isolating this 
aspect from posterior controls that may eventually apply – this article has argued that 
unrestrained authority, when it occurs, results from two combined factors: the 
absence of constraints in the law-making of international bureaucracies that takes into 
account the vertical effect their acts eventually have by effect of reception; the side-
stepping of procedural constraints that would constrain domestic administrative 
decision-makers if their decisions were adopted only internally and not triggered by 
reception of external decisions of which they are also authors. By effect of reception, 
inter- and transnational decisions of varied legal nature – recommendations to which 
states are legally bound to give effect, guidelines, standards, and so forth – eventually 
become binding on natural and legal persons. Neither the inter- and transnational 
procedures, nor the EU internal procedures that incorporate them, are designed in a 
way that considers this effective constraining character of a cascade of interlinked 
decisions. The problem is enhanced by the arguable limits of judicial review in this 
respect. 
The procedural standards of participation that are depleted by effect of reception 
have the capacity to structure and constrain the exercise of authority internally. This 
capacity is absent in the cases of inter- and transnational decision-making analyzed. 
Some of the standards depleted by effect of reception of external decisions do pertain 
more to administrative practice than to law. Yet, they are capable of fulfilling the 
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function equivalent legal rules of procedure would serve in structuring and defining 
limits to the exercise of discretion. Notwithstanding the differences between 
administrative practices and legal rules, procedural standards of participation, 
irrespective of their origin, nature and rationale, can usefully be re-interpreted with a 
legal lens and redesigned accordingly. From a legal perspective, they ought to ensure 
the procedural protection of the legally protected interests affected by decision-
making. They do so to the extent that, when accompanied by requirements of 
justification, they force the decision-makers to duly balance the public and private 
legally protected interests that they are bound to pursue and respect, by force of the 
applicable laws. In this way, procedural constraints of participation and justification 
can create the conditions to avoid biased decisions that potentially deny material 
justice. 
There are varied meanings of participation, but if re-interpreted and re-designed in 
the way proposed, procedural standards of participation can be read in the light of the 
rule of law. There are also varied views on the rule of law, and the possibility that, 
even with this meaning, participation can be seen as a rule of law requirement is 
contestable. This article has endorsed a procedural conception of the rule of law, 
based on the work of Waldron, and moved on to argue that unrestrained authority 
challenges the rule of law when there are little or no guarantees of due consideration 
of the legally protected interests affected by decisions that result from 
internationalized rulemaking procedures. Lack of procedural guarantees puts at stake 
the dignity of the persons affected – holders of those interests are treated as objects of 
decisions in which they do not have a voice. It also hinders the material justice of the 
public acts adopted – legally protected interests are disregarded while, by law, 
decision-makers ought at least consider them (as well as the possible effects of their 
decisions) in the composition of interest that underlies decision-making. In the 
absence of procedural constrains that ensure due consideration for the legally 
protected interests affected, the conditions for biased decisions increase, as do the 
conditions to evade public interests that decision-makers are legally bound to pursue. 
This is the reason why, in the perspective defended in this article, the rule of law is 
challenged when procedural standards of participation are depleted that have the 
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ability to structure discretion and constrain authority in a way that protects those 
values. 
The construction proposed in this article would require, first, a re-interpretation of 
the procedural standards of participation that are currently in place not only in inter- 
and transnational procedures but also in the EU. In the EU, current procedural 
constraints triggered by concerns of transparency, responsiveness and accountability 
have the capacity of functioning as legal guarantees against unrestrained authority, or 
at least can be re-interpreted in this light. In the decision-making procedures 
analyzed, this capacity is absent at the international and transnational levels. While 
the EU institutional practices are closer to the transformation proposed here, 
approaching them from a rule of law perspective would require that they would be 
capable of functioning as effective constraints. This stresses the limits of current EU 
procedures and procedural practices. They would need to be transformed accordingly. 
The effect would be creating legality (or quasi-legality) where it has not existed 
hitherto. The advantages and disadvantages of this transformation would need to be 
balanced in each regulatory setting. 
Importantly, this transformation would only be capable of constraining the 
exercise of authority that results from internationalized procedures if accompanied by 
a new way of approaching these procedures. Instances of exercise of authority can 
only be adequately identified if the procedures that operate the coordination of the 
different legal systems involved stop being viewed in segmented terms from a multi-
level perspective. Likewise, adequate solutions to structuring discretion and 
constraining authority depend on viewing internationalized procedures in their 
entirety, focusing on the functional interdependence of the segments developed at 
different levels of governance, and thereby capturing the regulatory chain triggered 
by decisions adopted at the inter- or transnational level. Ultimately, this perspective 
may lead to a re-conceptualization of the administrative procedures that operate the 
coordination of decisions taken in different regulatory sites. The article discussed the 
potential explanatory value but also the difficulties of constructing them as composite 
procedures. Alternatively, it suggested an actor-based approach to re-design 
internationalized procedures, in the light of the domestic ramifications of their 
  
 
 
44 
external decisions, by focusing on the procedural duties of domestic actors when 
acting in an external role. 
Framing the problem of depletion of procedural standards from the normative 
perspective proposed in this article highlights that, in whichever way processes of 
regulating public interests are organized, decisions made in pursuance of public 
interests should be linked back to the law that identifies them, with all this linkage 
symbolically entails. Decision-making processes where the balancing of competing 
public interests takes place are undoubtedly political and technical processes. In this 
sense, law may have a very limited role in defining the boundaries of the positive 
action of decision-makers. Be that as it may, there ought to be mechanisms that 
ensure decision-makers balance and duly consider the effects their decisions have in 
legally protected interests, while still acting within their mandate legal. Participation 
and justification, as approached in this article, is one of such mechanisms and can, as 
such, constitute a guarantee that internationalized administrative procedures are not 
bypassing and denying the law.  
